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The Intraday Response of U.S. and U.K. Interest Rates
to International Economic News
This study examines the importance of U.K. and U.S. macroeconomic
news on intraday price movements for bond futures contracts traded in
both countries. Using macroeconomic forecast data for major
announcements, we find that U.K. and U.S. participants are equally
sensitive to U.S. announcements, while the U.K. macroeconomic
information has an important influence on U.K. interest rates, but only
a minor, although significant, influence on U.S. interest rates. The
importance of U.S. news to bond markets provides insight on the causes
of previously documented international asset market linkages.
The Intraday Response of U.S. and U.K. Interest Rates
to International Economic News
The impact of home country macroeconomic releases on home country
asset prices has received much attention in the academic literature.
Jain (1988) and Pearce and Roley (1985) find that U.S. equity prices
respond to U.S. macroeconomic surprises, particularly to inflation and
money supply announcements. Hardouvelis (1988), Roley and Troll (1983),
Smirlock (1986), and Urich and Wachtel (1984) examine the relation
between U.S. announcements and U.S. interest rates. These studies
generally find that U.S. interest rates are particularly sensitive to
inflation and monetary announcements.
In the U.K., Goodhart and Smith (1985) find a significant negative
association between U.K. retail price index surprises and changes in
U.K. equity prices while money supply, trade balance, and government
borrowing requirement surprises have no impact on U.K. equity prices.
In contrast to the U.S. findings, however, Goodhart and Smith find that
U.K. releases have no impact on daily changes in either long- or short-
term U.K. interest rates.
While the extant research focuses on the effects of home country
announcements on home country asset returns, few studies investigate the
linkage between foreign country news releases and home country asset
^The most comprehensive of these studies is by Hardouvelis (1988),
who relates changes in T-Bill and T-Bond yields to 15 U.S.
announcements. Using bond prices from 1979 to 1984, he finds that CPI
and PPI surprises (defined as the actual announced value minus the
expected value) are positively and significantly related to T-Bond
yields; in contrast, these announcements have no impact on T-Bill
yields. He also finds that interest rate changes are directly related
to economic activity announcements as measured by unemployment and
retail sales.
2returns.^ An examination of the relative importance of foreign
information sheds light on the source of documented international asset
market linkages. Previous research [see, for example Hamao, Masulis,
and Ng (1990), Eun and Shim (1990), Koch and Koch (1990)) finds that the
U.S. equity market is the dominant world market, as U.S. fluctuations
are quickly transmitted to foreign equity markets. Eun and Shim (1990)
posit that the elevated awareness of U.S. equity market performance by
foreign participants is attributable to the dominance of the U.S. in the
world marketplace. Accordingly, news from the U.S. will influence
foreign asset prices because the U.S. is the leading producer of goods
and services in the world.
In this paper, we examine the impact of U.S. and U.K.
macroeconomic releases on intraday price movements for futures on U.S.
Eurodollars and T-Bonds, and U.K. Gilts. Because most asset prices are
influenced by the general level of interest rates, an investigation of
the importance of information to the international bond markets sheds
light on the sources of international asset linkages. In addition, our
use of intraday bond data to examine the impact of news releases on bond
prices is unique; in typical empirical investigations of the effect of
macroeconomic announcements on asset prices, daily closing data are
used. This practice, however, is not ideal because other information
occurring during the day could obscure the effects of the news on asset
prices. By using intraday bond prices (i.e., a narrower return window).
^An exception is Bailey (1990) who relates U.S. macroeconomic
announcements and equity returns for Pacific Basin countries.
3a more accurate estimate of the true effect of the news on the bond
prices can be obtained.
We focus on macroeconomic releases to investigate the importance
of general information from both countries on bond performance because
these disclosures possess several attractive attributes. First, these
news releases are made at predetermined dates and times. Second, the
difference between the actual announced value and the expected release
can be computed. Since these data are widely followed by market
participants, survey forecasts of expected releases are compiled by
investment services.^ Because the announcements occur at prespecified
times and because expected releases are readily available, bond price
changes surrounding the announcements can be related to the surprises
contained in the macroeconomic releases. These government releases
provide important information to bond market participants because,
unlike equities where private information is an important motivator of
volatility, the primary motivator of government bond price changes is
publicly available information.
The trading hours and structure of bond markets allow for a unique
and impartial test of the importance of U.S. and U.K. information.
^Survey forecasts are compiled by Money Market Services (MMS),
Technical Data, and I.D.E.A. Inc. Technical Data forecasts for the
upcoming week are available in Monday editions of the Wall Street
Journal and I.D.E.A. survey data are available in the New York Times
Sunday business section.
^However, Harvey and Huang (1992) find evidence of increased return
volatility in the Eurodollar and T-Bill futures market between
11:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. EST. This heightened volatility is
attributable to private information trading by the New York Federal
Reserve Bank implementing Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
directives through open market operations.
4Typically, U.K. macroeconomic announcements are circulated at
11:30 a.m. GMT while U.S. news is disclosed at 8:30 a.m. EST
(1:30 p.m. GMT). Unlike stock index futures contracts on U.S. indexes,
which trade only during U.S. equity trading hours, futures on Eurodollar
and T-Bonds trade during U.K. trading hours. Because these instruments
are active during U.K. releases, we are able to investigate the effect
of U.K. releases on U.S. bond prices surrounding the announcements. In
contrast, a study relating news on U.S. and U.K. intraday equity changes
would be biased against a finding of significant explanatory power of
U.K. news. This bias arises because the U.K. return surrounding the
U.S. news can be isolated to a 15 minute period whereas the effect of
U.K. news on S&P 500 performance is measured over a 17 and one-half hour
period, from the previous U.S. closing price to the current opening
price (9:30 a.m. EST). The U.K. information may be diluted with other
information such as Japanese and U.S. macroeconomic news, resulting in
both a much lower R^ value and also insignificant estimates of the
regression coefficients.
We find that U.S. news disclosures have a significant impact on
both U.S. and U.K. bond futures prices, explaining approximately
20 percent of U.S. bond fluctuations in the 15 minute period surrounding
the news and about 6 percent of U.K. 15 minute bond changes around the
announcements. In contract to previous research, we document a
significant relation between U.K. macroeconomic news and U.K bond
prices; however, these U.K. disclosures have little impact on U.S.
interest rates, particularly after the 1987 Louvre Accord. These
results demonstrate the importance of U.S. information to the world
5marketplace. In addition, this documented attention to U.S. news may
partially explain the observed international equity market correlation
structure.
We also find that most U.S. macroeconomic releases have a
significant impact on T-Bond and Eurodollar returns immediately
surrounding the news, while some of these announcements are not
significant if a longer holding period (open-to-close) is used to
measure bond performance. The lack of significance for some of the
variables when the bond performance is measured from the opening to the
closing price is attributable to a higher standard error for the
estimated coefficient as other news occurring during the trading day
obscures the true effect of the news on bond prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I
describes the data and methodology used in this study. In Section II,
the effect of U.S. news on U.S. and U.K. bond prices is explored while
Section III provides evidence of the impact of U.K. news on bond prices.
Section IV examines the impact of macroeconomic releases on short-term
trading activity. Section V concludes the paper.
I. Data
Fixed-income performance in the U.K. and U.S. is measured using
prices from bond futures contracts traded in both countries. Price
quotes closest to the quarter hour of every trading day from January 2,
1986 to December 28, 1990 are obtained from Tick Data Inc.^ for the U.K.
The majority of the database constructed by Tick Data Inc.,
consisting of intraday prices for all futures contracts traded in the
U.S. and London, has been compiled from official exchange time and sales
records.
6Long Gilt bond futures, traded on the London International Financial
Futures Exchange (LIFFE), the U.S. T-Bond futures and the Eurodollar
futures contracts. T-Bond and Eurodollar futures contracts are traded
at the LIFFE during U.K. trading hours; during U.S. trading hours, the
T-Bond futures are available at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and
the Eurodollar contracts trade at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).
Eurodollar contracts serve as a proxy for short-term U.S. interest rates
while the T-Bonds and Gilts represent long-term rates in the U.S. and
U.K., respectively.
U.K. Gilts are long-term negotiable bonds issued and guaranteed by
the British Government and denominated in sterling. The U.K. gilt
market accounts for the largest part of the sterling-denominated debt
market and is the fifth largest government bond market in the world.°
The LIFFE and CME Eurodollar contracts are very similar. The
trading unit consists of Eurodollar time deposits with a principal value
of $1 million and a three month maturity. Eurodollar contracts expire
in March, June, September, and December, and delivery is made by cash
settlement. The only major difference between the two contacts occurs
on the settlement date as the two exchanges utilize different survey
methods to obtain the final settlement price.
^A Gilt primary dealer market was established in November 1986 that
is similar to the U.S. T-bond market. As of June 1991, there were 18
Gilt-Edged Market Makers (GEMM's) including major U.K., U.S., Japanese,
and European securities firms.
See Harvey and Huang (1992) for more detail on the differences
between LIFFE and CME Eurodollar contracts.
Trading hours for the LIFFE Eurodollars and T-Bonds are from
8:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. GMT,^ while trading hours for the CME Eurodollars
and CBOT T-Bonds are from 8:20 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. EST.' Thus, Gilt and
U.S. bond futures trading span regular U.S. macroeconomic announcements,
which are typically released at 8:30 a.m. EST. U.K. macroeconomic
announcements are typically circulated during the U.K. trading day, at
11:30 a.m. GMT.
To measure bond performance, local currency logarithmic returns
are calculated: ln(p^/Pj.^), where p^ is the current bond futures prices
and p^_i is the lagged price. Prices are obtained for the near delivery
contract up to two trading days before a delivery month, when prices for
the next maturing contract are used. The crash week of October 17-23,
1987 is deleted from the sample. ^'^
U.S. and U.K. anticipated announcements are obtained from Money
Market Services (MMS) . The MMS data have been used extensively in
studies examining the effect of announcements on asset prices [see, for
example Jain (1988), Pearce and Roley (1985), and Hardouvelis (1988)].
The studies generally find that survey data, although biased, provide
^From 4:25 p.m. to 5:55 p.m., contracts are traded using the
Automated Pit Trading (APT) system. APT is a computer trading system
developed by the LIFFE which emulates the open outcry market.
^However, before November 8, 1988, CBOT T-Bond futures trading
commenced at 9:00 a.m. EST.
^°Harvey and Huang (1992) examine price movements of Eurodollar
futures contracts surrounding the 1987 market crash. They report that,
because of market intervention by the Federal Reserve, the Eurodollar
near maturity futures price increased from 90.40 to 92.40 from
October 19 to October 20, 1987.
8announcement forecasts that are superior to estimates derived from an
autoregressive time series model.
U.S. actual and forecast announcements are obtained from MMS for
the following series: civilian unemployment rate, consumer price index
(CPI), durable goods orders, housing starts, index of leading
indicators, merchandise trade balance, nonfarm payrolls, producer price
index (PPI), and retail sales. Announcements for the above series occur
at 8:30 a.m. EST. U.S. money supply announcements are not included in
the sample because they are released after U.S. trading hours, at
4:15 p.m. EST on Thursdays.
The following U.K. anticipated announcement data are obtained from
MMS: current account, industrial production, MO, PPI output, public
sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), retail price index (RPI), retail
sales, unemployment, and visible trade. ^^ These releases occur at
11:30 a.m. GMT. Table I provides summary statistics for the U.K. and
U.S. surprises, where a surprise is defined as the actual announced
value minus the expected value. ^^
^ The PSBR measures the borrowing requirement of the U.K.
government. MO comprises notes and coins in circulation outside the
Bank of England plus bankers' operational balances with the Bank.
Unlike the U.S., where money supply figures are circulated weekly, U.K.
monetary aggregate announcements occur monthly. See the Monthly Digest
of Statistics for information on U.K. announcements.
12Actual U.K. announced values are not available from MMS and are
obtained from the following U.K. publications: Monthly Digest of
Statistics
. Economic Trends , and Financial Statistics .
9II. Effects of U.S. Information on Bond Returns
A. Effects of U.S. Information on 15 Minute Bond Returns
To evaluate the impact of 8:30 a.m. EST U.S. announcements
(1:30 p.m. GMT) on the Gilts, Eurodollars, and T-Bond futures returns,
we estimate a regression equation, where the independent variables are
the surprises and the dependent variable is the asset returns from 8:30
to 8:45 a.m. EST. On trading days in which no announcement occurs for a
specific variable, the value of the surprise is assigned a value of
zero. Before November 1987, CBOT T-bond futures opened at
9:00 a.m. EST; thus, for this period, the T-Bond return is measured from
the previous closing price to the current opening price.
Table II presents estimated coefficients for OLS regressions
relating bond futures returns surrounding the announcements to U.S.
surprises. The Gilt returns are sensitive to U.S. surprises, with three
out of the nine U.S. surprise variables significant at the 1 percent
level (CPI, PPI, and nonfarm payrolls) and two significant at the
5 percent level (unemployment and leading indicators). In addition, the
U.S. disclosures explain approximately 6 percent of the Gilt changes
surrounding the announcements. The estimated coefficients indicate that
the Gilts are especially sensitive to inflation disclosures as a
positive 0.3 percent CPI (PPI) surprise tends to lead to a decline in
Gilt prices of 0.12 percent (0.07 percent). Surprises indicating
strength in the U.S. economy also lead to significant declines in Gilt
prices as U.S. nonfarm payrolls and leading economic indicators have a
negative sign and the unemployment rate possesses a positive sign.
10
The regression results presented in Table II also demonstrate the
importance of U.S. information to participants in the Eurodollar and
T-Bond futures markets; for Eurodollars and T-Bonds, five out of the
nine coefficients are significant at least at the 5 percent level while
an additional two coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level
for the T-Bonds. Similar to the Gilts, both the Eurodollar and T-bond
markets respond negatively to inflation surprises, while higher than
expected economic activity leads to lower bond prices.
The regression coefficients indicate that a positive 0.3 percent
CPI surprise leads to declines of approximately 0.47 percent and
0.06 percent for the T-Bonds and Eurodollars, respectively. A PPI
surprise has a significant but somewhat smaller impact on these markets.
Our finding that U.S. inflation surprises influence bond prices is
consistent wit Hardouvelis (1988), Roley and Troll (1983), Smirlock
(1986) and Urich and Wachtel (1984). Because these studies use T-Bill
and T-Bond interest rate changes rather than bond price returns as the
dependent variable, direct comparisons with the parameter values found
in our study are difficult; however, a common result is the importance
of U.S. inflation surprises to the U.S. bond markets. ^^
^Smirlock, using interest rate data for Treasury securities from
1979 to 1983 with maturities of 10, 20, and 30 years, finds that a
1 percent CPI (PPI) surprise leads to a change of 10, 9, and 9, basis
points (10, 13, 10 basis points) for the 10, 20, and 30 year bond rates,
respectively. Urich and Wachtel report that PPI surprises are
significantly related to short-term interest rates while CPI
announcements are not. They find that a 1 percent PPI surprise leads to
a 38 basis point increase in short-term rates. Hardouvelis, using
T-Bill and 20 year T-Bond interest rates from 1979 to 1984, reports that
a 1 percent PPI (CPI) surprise results in a 16 basis points (18 basis
points) increase in 20 year T-Bond yields. In contrast to Urich and
Wachtel, he finds that T-Bill yields do not respond to inflation news.
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The finding of a significant relation between U.S. merchandise
trade announcements and U.S. interest rates is also consistent with the
results of Aggarwal and Schirm (1992). Using daily closing prices for
T-Bill and T-Bond futures prices, they find that U.S. financial markets
have become particularly sensitive to international macroeconomic
announcements, especially since formal agreements for international
economic coordination have been implemented. For example, they find
that, from 1987 to 1988, after the Louvre Accord, T-Bond futures prices
were particularly sensitive to trade announcements (parameter value of
0.40, compared to our value of 0.1116).
Nonfarm payrolls are of particular interest to bond market
participants as a surprise expansion of the U.S. workforce by 100,000
people leads to a T-Bond decline of 0.29 percent and reductions in
Eurodollars and Gilts by 0.05 percent.
The nine surprises account for approximately 23 percent of the
Eurodollar fluctuations surrounding the announcements and 12 percent of
the T-Bond fluctuations. Hardouvelis (1988), using daily closing
interest rate data, reports much lower R^ values (7.6 percent for T-Bill
yields and 5.6 percent for T-Bond yields). The higher explanatory power
of the U.S. surprises in our study may be attributable to the more
refined 15 minute data used to explore the influence of the news.
Moreover, in this study, the higher R^ value for the Eurodollar
regression relative to the T-Bond regression arises because the
dependent variable for the T-Bond return is an overnight return from the
beginning of the time series to November 7, 1988. After T-Bond trading
hours were extended, the T-Bond performance is measured by the 8:30 to
12
8:45 a.m. EST return. Thus, the lower R value for the T-Bond
regression is due to the noise created by including overnight returns in
measuring T-Bond performance for the first sub-period, January 1986 to
November 7, 1988.''^
B. Effects of U.S. Information on Open-to-Close Bond Returns
Table III presents regressions in which the bond performance for
the Gilts, Eurodollars, and T-bonds is measured over a longer period,
from the opening to the closing price. T-values and significance levels
generally decline compared with results obtained with the narrower
return window. For example, five out of the nine U.S. information
variables are significant at the 5 percent level when Eurodollar
performance is measured for the 15 minute period surrounding the news
(Table II), while only three variables are significant when bond returns
are measured from open to close. Specifically, the unemployment rate
and the merchandise trade balance become insignificant when the longer
return window is used. Consistent with previous research, the R^ value
for the Eurodollar and T-Bond regressions are below 10 percent. While
U.S. news has a significant impact on the 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT Gilt
returns (as shown in Table II), results from Table III show that the
U.S. announcements do not have a significant impact on the Gilt open-to-
close returns; only one U.S. variable (unemployment) is significant at
the 5 percent level and the R^ for the regression is only 0.15 percent.
1 A.The impact of U.S. surprises on T-Bond returns from 8:30 to
8:45 a.m. EST after the extension of the T-Bond trading hours has been
estimated (results not reported). Parameter values and significance
levels for this regression are similar to the findings presented in
Table II. However, the R^ for the T-Bond regression after the extension
of trading hours is much higher, 33.24%.
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A closer inspection of Tables II and III is warranted because of
their strikingly dissimilar inferences regarding the importance of U.S.
news on international bond prices. Inspection of the two tables reveals
that parameter values are quite similar. For example, the CPI
coefficient in the 15 minute Gilt regression is equal to -0.40 while
this coefficient increases in absolute value to -0.60 in the open-to-
close regression. However, the CPI variable is not significant in the
open-to-close regression despite the larger absolute size of the
coefficient, while the coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level
when Gilt performance is measured directly surrounding the announcement.
The reduced significance levels for the second set of regressions
in Table III is attributable to the additional information and noise
that becomes available over an entire trading day. Since the open-to-
close return can be viewed as the sum of the intervening 15 minute
returns, all of which are independently distributed variables, the
variance of the open-to-close return is larger than the variance of the
15 minute return. In this situation, estimating the coefficient of a
surprise variable, which appears only in the 15 minute return
surrounding the announcement, within the context of the open-to-close
regression leads to unbiased but inefficient OLS estimates. In other
words, open-to-close regressions are biased against finding coefficient
significance even though the variable (U.S. news) has presumably been
fully reflected in the 15 minute return surrounding the announcement.
Table III, therefore, is less useful than Table II when used to draw
inferences about the importance of U.S. news on international bond
returns.
14
III. Effects of U.K. Information on Bond Returns
A. Effects'^of U.K. Information on 15 Minute Bond Returns
To measure the effect of U.K. announcements on bond prices, three
regressions are estimated using 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT returns for the
Gilts, Eurodollars, and T-Bonds from bond futures contracts traded at
the LIFFE as the dependent variables and U.K. surprises as the
independent variables.
Table IV presents estimated coefficients for regressions relating
U.K. disclosures and bond futures returns. Table IV demonstrates that
U.K. information influences U.K. bond returns, while U.K. news has a
small influence on U.S. bond prices. The announcements explain more
than 18 percent of the fluctuations in the Gilt returns surrounding the
announcements (11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT). The Gilts are sensitive to
U.K. foreign trade, government borrowing, and retail sales disclosures.
As Table IV indicates, a visible trade (current account) surprise of
£1 billion (trade deficit lower than expected) leads to an increase in
Gilt prices of roughly 0.57 percent (0.124 percent). Higher than
expected government borrowing (measured by the PSBR) of £1 billion leads
to a significant decline in Gilt prices of 0.0528 percent. In addition,
stronger than expected economic activity, measured by retail sales,
leads to significantly depressed Gilt prices. Surprisingly, Gilt price
changes are not significantly related to U.K. inflation surprises as
neither the PPI output nor the RPI are significant at the 10 percent
^^The time of U.K. money supply releases changed from 2:30 p.m. to
11:30 a.m. GMT in October 1986. In November 1986, the timing of the
PSBR disclosures also changed to 11:30 a.m. GMT. A surprise value of
zero is assigned for the MO and PSBR releases before the change to
11:30 a.m. GMT releases.
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level. The coefficient for MO disclosures, while negative, is also
insignificant.
In contrast, the U.K. news appears to have little impact on U.S.
bond prices. In the T-Bond regression, only the U.K. unemployment
variable is significant at the 5 percent level, while the current
account is the only significant variable in the Eurodollar regression.
B. Effects of Louvre Accord on Bond Reactions
Over the sample period (1986-1990), an important change in
international cooperation at the governmental level occurred.
Specifically, at the Louvre meeting in 1987, France, Germany, Japan, the
U.K., and the U.S. agreed to a policy shift aimed at stabilizing
exchange rates. Since international cooperation may have an effect on
the relation between foreign news and U.S. bond returns, we estimated
the impact of the Louvre Accord by including interaction terms defined
as the product of the Louvre dummy variable (=1 in the post-Accord
period, before) and each of the surprise variables.
The results are reported in Table V for the T-Bonds and Gilts.
(Eurodollar regression results are not reported. None of the
interaction variables are significant at the 10 percent level.)
Regarding the real activity variables, the table indicates that the U.K.
unemployment rate and retail sales had a significantly negative effect
(at the 5 percent level) on U.S. bond returns in the pre-Accord period.
To determine the effect of these variables in the post-Accord period, we
need to add the pre-Accord coefficient estimate and the interaction
term's estimated coefficient. For the unemployment rate, the
interaction term is insignificant. Thus, the post-Accord estimate is
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identical to the pre-Accord estimate. For retail sales, the interaction
term is significantly positive at the 1 percent level, and opposite in
sign, but equal in absolute value to the pre-Accord coefficient. Thus,
the post-Accord estimate for retail sales is zero. The findings in
Table V are consistent with those in Table IV. The coefficient
estimates in Table IV are a weighted sum of the pre- and post-Accord
coefficients. U.K. retail sales are insignificant in Table IV because
the post-Accord coefficient is zero, whereas the unemployment rate is
significantly negative in this table because the pre- and post-Accord
coefficients are statistically identical.
Regarding the U.K. RPI, Table V shows a pattern similar to that
for U.K. retail sales; the coefficient is significantly negative at the
10 percent level in the pre-Accord period, but because the interaction
term is also significantly positive at the 10 percent level and opposite
in value to the pre-Accord coefficient, the post-Accord coefficient is
not significantly different from zero. Table V shows, therefore, that
the Louvre Accord altered the influence of U.K. news on U.S. bond
prices. Prior to the Accord, U.K. retail sales and RPI had an impact on
U.S. interest rates. In the post-Accord environment, these two
variables became irrelevant for the pricing of U.S. bonds.
A comparison of the Gilt and T-Bond interaction regressions
(Table V) can offer a partial explanation of how the Louvre Accord
altered the effect of U.K. news on the U.S. and U.K. interest rates.
Prior to the Accord, the U.K. retail sales surprises influenced U.S.
T-Bonds but not U.K. Gilts, which suggests that the exchange rate system
effectively induced U.S. long-term rates to respond to an assortment of
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world-wide real activity shocks. After the Accord, U.S. T-Bonds are
statistically insulated from U.K. retail sales surprises, and the shock
falls entirely on the U.K. Gilts. In addition, inflation as measured by
U.K. RPI surprises does not seem to have any effect on U.K. Gilts even
after the Accord when U.S. T-Bonds are no longer affected by this
surprise. Apparently, the adjustment to RPI surprises has been
reflected solely in the exchange rate during the post-Accord period.
C. Effects of U.K. Information on Open-to-Close Bond Returns
Our results, showing that U.K. surprises influence Gilt prices,
differ from the findings of Goodhart and Smith (1985). Using daily
closing U.K. three-month interbank rates and 20 year Gilt prices from
1977 to 1983, they find that U.K. short- and long-term bond prices are
not responsive to U.K. surprises for M3, RPI, central government
borrowing requirement, and the visible trade balance. ^^ Again, our
results demonstrating the importance of U.K. news for U.K. bond prices
may be attributable to the use of more refined intraday bond data. To
support this claim. Table VI presents regression results which relate
U.K. surprises on open-to-close Gilt returns. Consistent with Goodhart
and Smith, the U.K. news does not have a strong influence on the Gilts,
with a 1.90 percent R^ value. The only significant variable is the
visible trade surprise.
Comparison of the adjusted R^ values from the Gilt regressions
presented in Tables II and IV reveals that U.K. information is more
^^In contrast to other studies, Goodhart and Smith do not utilize
expectations data from MMS, but rather use forecast data from a
brokerage firm.
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important to the Gilt market than U.S. news. U.K. surprises explain
approximately 18 percent of the changes in the 15 minute returns, while
the R^ in the U.S. news regression is approximately 6 percent.
In addition to the R^ values, an examination of intraday Gilt
return volatility patterns (see Becker, Finnerty, and Kopecky (1992))
indicates the importance of regularly scheduled macroeconomic releases
to the Gilt market. Volatility spikes occur at 11:30 a.m. and
1:30 p.m. GMT, with standard deviations of returns equal to
0.157 percent for the 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT returns and a standard
deviation of 0.107 percent for the 15 minute returns surrounding U.S.
announcements. Gilt volatility at 11:30 a.m. GMT is generally five
times greater than the variances for the surrounding 15 minute periods,
while the Gilt return variance at 1:30 p.m. GMT is approximately two
times greater than the variances for periods leading up to the U.S.
announcements. To further support the apparent lack of attention by
U.S. bond traders to U.K. news, Harvey and Huang (1992) document low
11:30 a.m. GMT volatility for Eurodollar and T-Bill futures contracts
traded at the LIFFE.
IV. Effects of Economic Releases on Trading Activity
The impact of surprises in both countries on bond trading activity
is also investigated. Previous research documents a positive relation
between price changes and volume and this empirical regularity is likely
attributable to the flow of information.^^ When information arrives
that is substantially different from expected, a divergence of opinion
'See Karpov (1987) for a review of studies dealing with the
relation between price movements and volume.
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between traders will occur, leading to increased volume. Thus, a direct
relation between the news content of a release of macroeconomic
information and volume is expected. However, Jain (1988) finds that
U.S. releases have no impact on U.S. equity volume as measured by the
S&P 500. A possible explanation for this result is that most U.S.
announcements occur before the equity market is open, at 9:30 a.m. EST,
giving traders an extended period to evaluate the consequences of the
announcements
.
To analyze the relation between the surprises and trading
activity, regressions are estimated of the absolute value of the
surprises on the total number of trades in the 15 minute interval
i o
surrounding the announcement." Regression results presented in
Table VII show a positive relation between U.S. surprises and Gilt and
Eurodollar activity surrounding U.S. announcements.^' The absolute
value of the surprises explain approximately 26 percent of the Gilt and
Eurodollar number of trades from 8:30 to 8:45 a.m. EST. Most of the
independent variables are significant at the 1 percent level with the
exception of the housing starts release.
Table VIII shows the influence of U.K. surprises on trading
activity. Most U.K. announcements are significantly related to the
°The first order autocorrelation coefficient for the number of
trades series is positive and significant. Thus, the trading activity
regressions are corrected for the first order autocorrelation by
differencing the umber of trades in the current period and the lagged
number of trades times the first order autocorrelation coefficient:
#TRADES^ - (#TRADESj.^ * P) •
An analysis of T-Bond trading activity was not examined because
CME T-Bond future trading did not span U.S. announcements for much of
the series (January 1986 to November 8, 1988).
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number of Gilt trades surrounding the announcements. U.K. disclosures,
however, have a small influence on LIFFE Eurodollar and T-Bond activity,
with only U.K. RPI releases significant at the 1 percent level.
V. Conclusion
Previous research concentrates on the influence of home country
macroeconomic releases on home country assets. These studies generally
find that asset prices respond to regularly scheduled government
releases. This study investigates the relative importance of U.S. and
U.K. macroeconomic announcements on bond markets in both countries to
examine the source of international asset market linkages.
We find that bond futures returns in both countries respond to
domestic news. While our finding that U.S. news influences U.S. bond
prices is not novel, our finding of a significant Gilt reaction to U.K.
news is unique. The U.S. news explains approximately 20 percent of
Eurodollar returns surrounding the announcements and nearly 7 percent of
the open-to-close returns. Similarly, the U.K. announcements explain
20 percent of Gilt 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT returns and approximately
2 percent of the open-to-close returns. This significant reaction of
U.K. bonds to U.K. news could be attributable to the use of a narrower
holding period (11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT) to measure bond performance.
Using this narrower return window, we find that most home country
announcements have a significant impact on home country bond returns.
Previous research generally finds that only inflation and money supply
news move bond prices.
The Gilts respond to U.S. macroeconomic news while U.S. bond
prices generally ignore U.K. information. The U.S. news explains
21
approximately 6 percent of the Gilt returns surrounding the news and
less than 1 percent of the open-to-close returns while the U.K.
announcements have a marginal influence on U.S. bonds. When
investigated in more detail with a dummy variable technique, the latter
finding seems to have arisen after the 1987 Louvre Accord. Nonetheless,
our procedure is an impartial test of the importance of news from both
countries because, unlike equities, U.S. bond futures are actively
traded when U.K. news is circulated.
In addition, we find that U.S. announcements influence trading
activity as measured by the number of trades in the 15 minute period
after the announcements. While U.K. disclosures motivate Gilt activity,
these announcements have a small impact on the number of Eurodollar and
T-Bond ratings at the LIFFE; only absolute deviations in the U.K. RPI
seem to influence the trading activity of U.S. instruments.
Based on the empirical results in this paper, one can infer that
other news originating from the U.S., such as company specific news,
public pronouncements by government officials, and news and rumors
regarding Federal Reserve activities, influence U.K. interest rates. In
contrast, our findings demonstrate that U.S. market participants
maintain a more provincial perspective and remain focused on domestic
events. The importance of U.S. news may explain previously documented
equity asset market linkages. This body of research generally finds
that the U.S. is the dominant market, with U.S. returns leading foreign
returns by one day. These common worldwide movements may be
attributable to common reactions to U.S. public information. For
example, if U.S. inflation is higher than expected, U.S. bond and equity
22
prices will decline. Similarly, foreign asset prices will respond alike
to the U.S. prices, resulting in a correlation structure in which U.S.
returns lead foreign returns.
I-JF.8-24
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Table I
Summary Statistics for U.S. and U.K. Surprises
Panel A: U.S.
Announcement Units
Mean High Low
Surprise Surprise Surprise
0.008% 0.30% -0.20%
0.248% 6.80% -7.50%
-0.033 0.24 -1.55
0.000% 0.80% -0.90%
-0.313 3.10 -6.30
18.66 331 -306
-0.064% 0,60% -1.10%
-0.026% 1.90% -1.80%
-0.067 0.60% -0.40%
CPI
Durable Goods
Housing Starts
Leading Ind.
Merchandise Tr.
Nonfarm Payrolls
PPI
Retail Sales
Unemployment
%A from previous month
%A from previous month
Million units
%A from previous month
$ Billion
A in thousands from
previous month
%A from previous month
%A from previous month
% workforce
Panel B: U.K.
Announcement Units
Mean High Low
Surprise Surprise Surprise
-0.144 0.94 -1.83
-0.174% 2.21% -2.77%
-0.059% 0.52% -1.35%
0.025% 0.37% -0.57%
-0.387 0.37 -2.55
0.068% 3.05% -1.32%
0.052% 0.70% -0.96%
-6.147 32.20 -59.30
-0.096 0.79 -1.15
Current Acct.
Ind. Prod
MO
PPI Output
PSBR
Retail Sales
RPI
Unemployment
Visible Trade
£ Billion
%A from previous month
%A from previous month
%A from previous month
A from previous month
%A from previous month
%A from previous month
A unemployed in thousands
Billion
Table II
Effect of U.S. Surprises on Intraday Gilt, Eurodollar,
and T-Bond Futures Returns
OLS coefficient estimates and t-values (in parenthesis, absolute value)
measuring the effect of U.S. macroeconomic surprises on alternative bond
returns from 1986 to 1990. Independent variables are U.S. surprises,
defined as the actual 8:30 a.m. EST announced figure minus the expected
value. The dependent variable for the first regression is the U.K. Gilt
logarithmic return from 8:30 to 8:45 a.m. EST (1:30 to 1:45 p.m. GMT).
For the second regression, the dependent variable is the Eurodollar
futures return from 8:30 to 8:45 a.m. EST. For the T-Bond regression,
the dependent variable is the previous CBOT close to the 9 a.m. EST
opening price from January 2, 1986 to November 8, 1988 and the return is
measured for the 15 minute period surrounding the 8:30 a.m. EST
announcement from November 8, 1988 to December 1990.
GILT8:30-8:45 EURO8:30-8:45 TBOND8:30-8:45
INTERCEPT -0.0024
(0.82)
0.0000**
(1.79)
-0.0105
(0.94)
CPI -0. 4026***
(3.48)
-0.2054***
(5.80)
-1.5717***
(3.94)
PPI -0.2335***
(5.58)
-0. 1341***
(10.26)
-1.1512***
(7.62)
UNEMPL 0.1753***
(2.33)
0.0732***
(3.07)
0.4556*
(1.66)
LEADING IND. -0.1024**
(2.43)
-0.0118
(0.85)
-0.2515
(1.56)
DURABLE GOODS -0.0021
(0.53)
-0.0021
(1.62)
-0.0518***
(3.38)
MER. TRADE BAL. -0.0047
(0.67)
0.0055**
(2.40)
0.1116***
(4.13)
NON-FARM PAYR. -0.0005***
(4.94)
-0
.
0005***
(13.17)
-0.0029***
(7.16)
RETAIL SALES -0.0300
(1.56)
-0.0091
(1.46)
-0.1319*
(1.87)
HOUSING STARTS 0.0297
(0.52)
-0.0081
(0.43)
-0.0884
(0.42)
F VALUE 9 .85***
6.11%
40. 63***
23.30%
19.03***
12.29%
***Signif icant at the
**Signif icant at the
*Significant at the
1 percent level.
5 percent level.
10 percent level.
Table III
Effect of U.S. Surprises on Open-to Close Gilt, Eurodollar,
and T-Bond Futures Returns
OLS coefficient estimates and t-values (in parenthesis, absolute value)
measuring the effect of U.S. macroeconomic surprises on alternative bond
returns from 1986 to 1990. Independent variables are U.S. surprises,
defined as the actual 8:30 a.m. EST announced figure minus the expected
value. The dependent variables are the open-to-close Gilt, Eurodollar,
and T-Bond returns. T-Bond data are from November 8, 1988 (the date
that T-Bond trading expanded to span 8:30 a.m. EST announcements) to
December 31, 1990.
GILT
o-c
EURO. TBOND,
INTERCEPT
CPI
PPI
UNEMPL
LEADING IND.
DURABLE GOODS
MER. TRADE BAL.
NON-FARM PAYR.
RETAIL SALES
HOUSING STARTS
F VALUE
-0.0016 -0.0012 0.0205
(1.03) (0.50) (0.94)
-0.6000 -0.1764** -1.3463*
(0.99) (2.08) (1.88)
-0.3307 -0.1023*** -0.3849
(1.50) (3.18) (1.32)
0.8023** 0.0892 2.1605***
(2.03) (1.56) (2.73)
-0.1947 -0.0159 0.5495*
(0.88) (0.48) (1.64)
-0.0112 -0.0029 -0.0251
(0.53) (0.93) (0.86)
-0.0231 0.0013 -0.8046
(0.63) (0.23) (1.05)
-0.0005 -0.0006*** -0.0042***
(0.93) (8.13) (5.00)
-0.0446 -0.0192 -0.3383*
(0.44) (1.28) (1.91)
0.0146 -0.0015 0.3310
(0.05) (0.03) (0.48)
1.21 10.80*** 6.00***
0.15% 6.98% 7.87%
***Signif icant at the 1 percent level.
**Signif icant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table IV
Effect of U.K. Surprises on Intraday Gilt, Eurodollar,
and T-Bond Futures Returns
OLS coefficient estimates and t-values (in parenthesis, absolute value)
measuring the effect of U.K. macroeconomic surprises on bond returns
from 1985 to 1990. Independent variables are U.K. surprises, defined as
the actual 1130 a.m. GMT announced figure minus the expected value. The
dependent variables for the regressions are the 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT
logarithmic returns for the LIFFE Gilts, Eurodollars, and T-Bonds,
respectively.
INTERCEPT
CURRENT ACC,
VISIBLE TRADE
IND. PROD.
MO
PPI-OUTPUT
RPI
PSBR
RETAIL SALES
UNEMPLOYMENT
F VALUE
ADJUSTED r2
'^""^llzSO-lli^S '="'^^11:30-11:45 ^°^'''^ 11:30- 11:45
-0.0129 -0.0001 -0.0017
(3.16) (0.73) (1.27)
0.1242** 0.0066** 0.0034
(2.02) (2.01) (0.17)
0.5722*** -0.0039 0.0283
(7.62) (0.96) (1.16)
-0.0033 0.0013 0.0019
(0.18) (1.33) (0.31)
-0.0993 -0.0013 0.0335
(1.47) (0.36) (1.53)
0.0153 -0.0011 -0.0180
(0.13) (0.18) (0.47)
-0.1106 0.0006 0.0054
(1.49) (0.16) (0.22)
-0.0528*** 0.0006 -0.0016
(2.61) (0.58) (0.24)
-0.0726***
-0.0009 0.0003
(5.03) (1.19) (0.07)
0.0000 0.0006 -0.0074**
(0.01) (1.04) (2.02)
30.80*** 1.10 0.53
18.60% 0.08% 0.00%
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Signif icant at the 10 percent level,
Table V
Effect of the 1987 Louvre Accord on LIFFE Gilt and T-Bond Returns
OLS coefficient estimates and t-values (in parenthesis, absolute value)
measuring the effect of U.K. macroeconomic surprises on bond returns
from 1986 to 1990. Independent variables are U.K. surprises, defined as
the actual 11:30 a.m. GMT announced figure minus the expected value and
the interaction terms defined as the product of the Louvre dummy
variable (=1 in the post-Accord period and before) and each of the
surprise variables. The dependent variables for the regressions are the
11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT logarithmic returns for the LIFFE Gilts, and
T-Bonds, respectively.
GILT11:30-11:45 TBOND 11:30-11:45
INTERCEPT -0.0135***
(3.36)
-0.0011
(0.37)
CURRENT ACC. 0.2421
(1.52)
0.0116
(0.23)
VISIBLE TRADE 0.0577
(0.34)
0.0605
(1.11)
IND. PROD. -0.0437
(1.00)
0.0040
(0.28)
MO 0.0641
(0.36)
0.0731
(1.26)
PP I -OUTPUT -0.0223
(0.06)
-0.1484
(1.14)
RPI -0.1820
(0.55)
-0.1974*
(1.80)
PSBR -0.1514*
(1.87)
0.0311
(1.16)
RETAIL SALES -0.0300
(1.08)
-0.0211**
(2.31)
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.0046
(0.17)
-0.0019**
(2.15)
DUM8 7*CURRENT ACCOUNT 0.1525
(0.89)
-0.0161
(0.29)
DUM87*VISIBLE TRADE 0. 6656***
(3.49)
-0.0468
(0.76)
Table V (continued)
DUM87* INDUSTRIAL PROD. 0.0493 -0.0027
(1.03) (0.17)
DUM87*M0 -0.1901 -0.0503
(0.99) (0.80)
DUM87*PPI-OUTPUT 0.0281 0.1494
(0.07) (1.10)
DUM87*RPI 0.0775 0.2147*
(0.23) (1.91)
DUM87*PSBR 0.1038 -0.0341
(1.24) (1.24)
DUM87*RETAIL SALES -0.0557* 0.0288***
(1.72) (2.71)
DUM87*UNEMPLOYMENT 0.0577 0.0014
(0.20) (1.45)
F VALUE 17.13*** 1.30
ADJUSTED R^ 19.11% 0.53%
***Signif leant at the 1 percent level.
**Signif leant at the 5 percent level.
*Signif leant at the 10 percent level
Table VI
Effect of U.K. Surprises on Open-to Close Futures Returns
OLS coefficient estimates and t-values (in parenthesis, absolute value)
measuring the effect of U.K. macroeconomic surprises on bond returns
from 1986 to 1990. Independent variables are U.K. surprises, defined as
the actual 11:30 a.m. GMT announced figure minus the expected value.
The dependent variables are the LIFFE Gilt, Eurodollar, and T-Bond
returns. The dependent variables are the LIFFE, Gilt, Eurodollar, and
T-Bond open-to-close returns.
GILT. EURO
o-c
TBOND
o-c
INTERCEPT
CURRENT ACC.
VISIBLE TRADE
IND. PROD.
MO
PPI-OUTPUT
RPI
PSBR
RETAIL SALES
UNEMPLOYMENT
F VALUE
ADJUSTED R^
-0.0121 0.0045 -0.0612
(0.73) (0.32) (0.99)
0.2951 0.0051 -0.0145
(1.25) (0.02) (0.01)
0.5855** 0.1021 -0.0056
(2.04) (0.39) (0.01)
0.0917 0.0251 -0.0145
(1.30) (0.36) (0.06)
-0.0534 -0.1025 0.0061
(0.21) (0.43) (0.01)
0.2322 -0.0251 0.0788
(0.52) (0.06) (0.04)
-0.2713 -0.0831 0.0487
(0.95) (0.31) (0.04)
-0.0825 0.0430 -0.0193
(1.07) (0.61) (0.06)
-0.0584 -0.0199 -0.0006
(1.06) (0.40) (0.00)
0.0013 0.0017 -0.0012
(0.30) (0.42) (0.07)
3. 63*** 0.17 0.00
1.90% 0.00 0.00
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table VII
Effect of U.S. Surprises on the Number of Trades
OLS coefficient estimates and t-values (in parenthesis, absolute value)
measuring the effect of U.S. macroeconomic surprises on the number of
trades per 15 minute period from 1986 to 1990. Independent variables
are the absolute value of U.S. surprises, defined as the actual
8; 30 a.m. EST announced figure minus the expected value. The dependent
variables are the number of trades for the LIFFE Gilt and the CME
Eurodollar near maturity contract from 8:30 to 8:45 a.m. EST.
INTERCEPT 13.69***
(24.59)
CPI 116.20***
(6.13)
PPI 66.85***
(9.19)
UNEMPL 34.52**
(2.18)
LEADING IND. 15.68**
(2.15)
DURABLE GOODS 3.99***
(5.72)
MER. TRADE BAL. 12.67***
(10.41)
NON-FARM PAYR. 0.18***
(7.68)
RETAIL SALES 23.22***
(6.92)
HOUSING STARTS 18.86*
(1.91)
F VALUE 49.02***
R^ 26.06%
DW 2.01
TB0ND,,,,,^3
10 . 18***
(21 .86)
98 , 72 * * *
(6 .17)
55,.12***
(9,.05)
62,. 87***
(4,.78) ^
18,.13***
(2,.94)
3,,67***
(6.,21)
8. 54* * *
(8..28)
0., 16***
(8.,52)
17. 33***
(6. 09)
6. 49
(0. 39)
54. 32 * * *
27. 61%
2. 07
•**Signif icant at the 1 percent level.
**Signif icant at the 5 percent level.
*Signif icant at the 10 percent level.
Table VIII
Effect of U.K. Surprises on the Number of Trades
OLS coefficient estimates and t-vaiues (in parenthesis, absolute value)
measuring the effect of U.K. macroeconomic surprises on the number of
trades per 15 minute period from 1986 to 1990. Independent variables
are the absolute value of U.K. surprises, defined as the actual
1130 a.m. GMT announced figure minus the expected value. The dependent
variables are the number of trades for the LIFFE Gilt, Eurodollar, and
T-Bond near maturity contract from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m. GMT.
INTERCEPT
CURRENT ACC.
VISIBLE TRADE
IND. PROD.
MO
PP I-OUTPUT
RPI
PSBR
RETAIL SALES
UNEMPLOYMENT
F VALUE
AD«:
DW
DJUSTED r2
^^^'^#TRADES EURO#TRADES TBOND,,,,,,s
15.97*** 2. 67*** 3.74***
(24.57) (28.54) (23.49)
12.78 -0.29 -1.54
(1.08) (0.17) (0.53)
71.98*** 0.62 3.65
(4.98) (0.30) (1.03)
10.12*** -0.56 0.48
(3.61) (1.38) (0.68)
48.45*** -2.44* -0.23
(4.77) (1.67) (0.09)
65. 74*** -2.77 -6.41
(3.53) (1.03) (1.41)
70.60*** 6. 60*** 8.93***
(6.29) (4.09) (3.25)
20.30*** 0.20 -1.01
(6.69) (0.46) (1.35)
12.36*** 0.22 0.59
(5.40) (0.68) (1.05)
0.83*** 0.04* -0.02
(4.85) (1.78) (0.40)
40.70*** 2.56*** 1.95***
22.54% 1.13% 0.69%
2.04 2.03 2.07
***Signif icant at the 1 percent level.
**Signif icant at the 5 percent level.
Significant at the 10 percent level,
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